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STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECTION AND 
RECRUITMENT OF POLICE: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION 
KAMI CHAVIS SIMMONS* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is now widely accepted that much police misconduct and corruption 
stems from the institutional culture of the police organization itself.1 The 
impact of this assertion is that remedial measures once thought to address 
police misconduct and corruption—such as, the exclusionary rule, tort or 
criminal suits against police officers, the possibility of internal police 
investigations, and hearings before citizen complaint review boards—while 
still important, have a declining significance when discussing the long-term, 
sustainable reforms needed to address the organizational roots of police 
misconduct.2 The institutional nature of police misconduct coupled with the 
inadequacy of other measures to effectively address police misconduct has 
encouraged many policymakers to embrace a system of reforms aimed at 
changing that organizational culture.3 Transparency and accountability should 
be the hallmarks of police agencies in a democratic society, and those studying 
this “new paradigm of police accountability” have given great attention to 
 
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. The Author would like to thank Cory 
Howard, Thomas Mayhew, and Zachary Underwood for their invaluable research assistance. 
 1. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 455 (2004) (asserting that it is a mistake to view misconduct as the result of 
the flawed judgments of individual officers rather than as induced by an organizational culture); 
see also Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 24 (2003) 
(noting that it is the organizational culture of law enforcement agencies and not the conduct of 
individual officers that breeds police misconduct); see also Kami C. Simmons, New Governance 
and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 
CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 381 (2010) (noting that the basis of police misconduct is the 
organizational culture of police departments). 
 2. The exclusionary rule, which supporters heralded as a deterrent to police misconduct, 
has long been maligned and observers have questioned its efficacy as a tool to address police 
malfeasance. The Supreme Court recently dealt a severe blow to the exclusionary rule in Hudson 
v. Michigan, when it declared that a violation of the knock and announce rule does not require 
suppression of the evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 
599 (2006). 
 3. Simmons, supra note 1, at 392–93. 
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implementing reforms that pierce the insularity familiar to many local law 
enforcement agencies in the United States.4 
This era of organizational or institutional reform of police agencies was 
born in the midst of another dynamic shift in policing—from centralized 
command and control policing to community policing.5 Community policing, 
though difficult to define, is commonly characterized as a model of policing 
that emphasizes problem-solving and partnerships between police and the 
communities they serve.6 Several common features of community policing 
programs are regular contact between officers and citizens, increased officer 
accessibility in a decentralized location, and an emphasis on community 
members identifying problems and cooperating with officers to address these 
problems.7 Community policing, because of its emphasis on the participation 
of community members in problem-solving, has been deemed “democracy in 
action.”8 
 
 4. David A. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1811 (2005) 
(explaining that community policing is an attempt to end the segregation of police departments 
and communities by opening up new avenues of communication); Walker, supra note 1, at 6, 26 
(calling the movement to increase the accountability of police and to utilize better policing tactics 
a “new paradigm of police accountability” and noting that it requires increased transparency and 
accountability to build community trust); see also Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An 
Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills 
of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 242 (2005) (noting that in a democratic society, law 
enforcement must be guided by the principles of accountability and transparency). 
 5. See David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report From the Devil’s Advocate, in 
COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 236 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. 
Mastrofski eds., 1991) (noting that “[community policing] is the most fundamental change in 
policing since the rise of police professionalism early in this century.”). By 2000, nearly 87 
percent of police agencies had implemented a form of policing consistent with the ideals of 
community policing. See LINDA S. MILLER & KÄREN M. HESS, COMMUNITY POLICING: 
PARTNERSHIPS FOR PROBLEM SOLVING 20 (4th ed. 2005) (citing THOMAS C. FRAZIER, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR’S NOTES: A DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY POLICING 2 (2000)). 
 6. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 575 (1997) (stating that 
community policing is a general term that applies to police strategies which focus on developing 
working partnerships between the community and the police); James Forman, Jr., Community 
Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6–8 (2004) (explaining that 
while community policing can refer to a variety of law enforcement activities, it more broadly 
refers to the organizational structure of law enforcement that prioritizes and encourages civic 
engagement); see also Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1593, 1598 (2002) (noting that one unifying feature of community policing is police engagement, 
collaboration and partnership with private citizens). 
 7. See LINDA S. MILLER & KÄREN M. HESS, THE POLICE IN THE COMMUNITY: 
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 18 (3d ed. 2002). 
 8. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING 
COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 4 (1994), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdf 
files/commp.pdf. 
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Absent from many of the discussions involving the institutional reform of 
police agencies is how the tenets of community policing, which are inherently 
embedded in democratic theory, can inform organizational changes that 
reformers hope to implement. These two shifts should not be divorced from 
each other, but rather should inform one another in order to maximize benefits 
for the communities. The shift to organizational reform and the continued 
implementation of community policing require police agencies to pay close 
attention to the qualities, characteristics, and values their officers need to 
implement a community-oriented style of policing.9 Community policing is 
premised upon the assumption that members of the community add value and 
can be integral in improving the public safety of the community, if they 
cooperate and partner with local police.10 
Modern police culture tolerates or cultivates police misconduct and 
corruption in many ways.11 Failures to identify, monitor, and discipline 
“problem” officers; a belief that violence is a necessary part of law 
enforcement; and the code of silence; are organizational characteristics that 
need to be addressed in order to remedy organizational failures to hold law 
enforcement officers accountable.12 In order to address these cultural 
characteristics, police departments should carefully select police officers less 
likely to engage in these behaviors and adhere to these beliefs. Viewed through 
the lens of stakeholder participation, however, a fundamental shift should 
occur regarding how these new officers are selected. Consistent with the 
principles of community policing, police departments should develop 
processes to allow the community to participate in the selection and 
recruitment process. Although community involvement in the selection of 
officers has long been a component of many departments’ implementation of 
community policing, when suggesting or implementing organizational reform, 
there has been no requirement or even incentives to support the involvement of 
the community in this way.13 Therefore, this Article asserts that true 
“democratic policing” allows for the participation of the community in all 
aspects of policing, and that this involvement should begin as early as 
recruitment and selection of the police officers who will serve the community. 
 
 9. Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime 
Control: Should One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1288–
89 (2000) (discussing importance that individual officers have characteristics that are “conducive 
to community policing”). 
 10. See Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, in 39 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 19 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010) (arguing that cooperation 
between police and private citizens is necessary to identify problems and reduce crime in the 
community). 
 11. See generally Simmons, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. at 381–82. 
 13. Id. at 416–17. 
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This Article offers a modest proposal for ways in which the federal 
government could encourage or incentivize the inclusion of the community in 
the hiring and selection process. Specifically, this Article advocates that the 
federal government should require police departments within its jurisdiction 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to implement such programs. Furthermore, for 
jurisdictions that have not come within the purview of the United States 
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) federal pattern or practice authority, the 
government should encourage and incentivize local community involvement in 
hiring police officers by making grants to departments that devise successful 
programs. 
Part I discusses the fundamental critiques of modern police agencies and 
the role that organizational culture plays in police corruption and misconduct. 
Lax supervision, a belief that violence is a necessary part of the job, and the 
code of silence are hallmarks of many local police agencies. This Part will 
explain how scholars and reformers have focused on addressing these cultural 
characteristics through external reforms aimed at greater transparency and 
integrity. This Part focuses on the United States government’s role in police 
reform through its pattern or practice authority. It also examines how the 
failure to include local stakeholders may impede the federal government’s 
ability to ensure long-term reforms in the nation’s most troubled police 
departments. 
Part II explains that while the federal government has played an important 
role in articulating principles of police reform, and has also played an 
important role in encouraging, through federal grant money, community 
policing, it has missed an opportunity to fully integrate the two paradigms. 
Drawing upon democratic principles of stakeholder participation, Part II 
suggests that with proper oversight and accountability, involving various 
constituencies in the reforms of local police departments may result in more 
cooperation from officers and the community—resulting in more sustainable 
reforms. 
Part III offers a specific example of how police departments could infuse 
democratic principles of community policing into the selection and recruitment 
of police officers. This Part argues that the federal government might 
successfully encourage this form of community involvement by routinely 
including it as an element of agreements it enters with police departments 
pursuant to its pattern or practice authority. The federal government can 
achieve this by making the receipt of federal funds for community-oriented 
policing conditional on implementing a community recruitment program. In 
the past, emphasis has been placed on who the police hire and how the 
characteristics of police officers might improve the police culture.14 However, 
 
 14. Waldeck, supra note 9, at 1288–89 (increasing educational attainment and diversity). 
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less emphasis has been given regarding how these officers are selected.15 This 
Part explains the need for community involvement in the hiring and selection 
of police officers. This Part further explores how such involvement is 
consistent with community policing and represents a great model of 
stakeholder participation in police reform. Furthermore, it discusses specific 
examples of community participation, including Sacramento, California and 
Hillsborough, Florida, where members of the community participated in focus 
groups to determine selection criteria of new police hires, participated in 
recruiting officers from the community, and sponsored candidates in the 
academy. 
Part IV concludes with posing some of the challenges or counterarguments 
to the proposal, as well as identifying questions for future study. Little data has 
been collected or analyzed about the efficacy of the community recruiter 
programs. Future empirical work should focus on whether community 
perception has changed, whether citizen complaints against police decreased in 
these areas, and whether there was a positive impact on police-community 
partnerships. 
I.  CRITIQUES OF MODERN U.S. POLICE CULTURE AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
A. The Need for Institutional Reform of Police Agencies 
1. Examples of Institutional Police Misconduct 
In order to understand the importance of addressing police misconduct 
through changing the institutional culture of a law-enforcement agency, it is 
important to understand the fundamental critiques of modern police 
organizations. Many scholars and independent commissions examining the 
causes of police misconduct have concluded that the roots of police 
misconduct are organizational in nature.16 No longer is the malfeasance of a 
 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 1288–96 (addressing various officer characteristics conducive to 
community policing, but failing to provide any discussion regarding officer hiring and selection). 
 16. See, e.g., THE CHRISTOPHER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON 
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION], 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad= rja& 
ved=0CDEQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.parc.info%2Fclient_files%2FSpecial%2520Rep
orts%2F1%2520-%2520Chistopher%2520Commision.pdf&ei=aEBWUNCsC-aayQGnzYCoAg 
&usg=AFQjCNEWmdeKoK5vb4nUgBmHFcVI2q1kJA (discussing the LAPD’s management 
culture and its relation to police misconduct); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: 
POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 33, 45 (1998), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/police/index.htm (reporting that many of the 
problems identified in police departments across the nation had an organizational component); 
Armacost, supra note 1, at 493–94 (detailing the organizational roots of police brutality); see also 
THE N.Y.C. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT 51 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN 
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police officer attributed to that particular officer’s characteristics, rather 
instances of police misconduct are typically viewed in the larger context of the 
police agency.17 There is a widespread recognition of a “powerful 
organizational culture that significantly influences and constrains [police 
officers’] judgments and conduct.”18 Several important characteristics of police 
culture include “(1) the phenomenon known as ‘the blue wall of silence;’ (2) a 
lack of effective identification and discipline of problem officers; and (3) the 
widespread belief among various levels and ranks of police officers that some 
violence or brutality is a necessary part of effective policing.”19 Not only do 
these organizational characteristics promote an organizational structure within 
law-enforcement institutions that tolerates and encourages a culture of police 
misconduct, but they also contribute to an “us versus them” mentality between 
the officers and the communities they serve.20 
Several famous examples of police misconduct are helpful to illustrate this 
theory of the institutional nature of police misconduct. For example, in 1991, 
the videotaping of the infamous beating of motorist Rodney King shocked the 
nation.21 Viewers from all over the world saw several Los Angeles police 
officers brutally kick and beat Rodney King.22 Perhaps what was equally 
disturbing was the number of officers who, while they did not actively 
participate in the beating, simply stood by and watched without intervening.23 
Several years later, in what became known as the Los Angeles Rampart 
Scandal, numerous officers were involved in planting false evidence, securing 
coerced confessions, and perjury.24 As a result of this widespread corruption, 
one hundred convictions were overturned and four officers were convicted in 
 
COMMISSION], available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/4%20-%20Mol 
len%20Commission%20-%20NYPD.pdf (“[P]olice culture—the attitudes and values that shape 
officers’ behavior—is a critical component of the problem of police corruption today”). 
 17. Armacost, supra note 1, at 476. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Simmons, supra note 1, at 381–82. 
 20. See generally Armacost, supra note 1, at 501 (noting that the bond developed between 
police officers breeds an intense loyalty that pits police officers against citizens); see also David 
Crump, The Social Psychology of Evil: Can the Law Prevent Groups From Making Good People 
Go Bad?, BYU L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2008) (citing testimony of former LAPD officer Rafael 
Perez at his sentencing hearing: “The ‘us against them’ ethos of the overzealous cop began to 
consume me.”). 
 21. Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in 
Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1455–56 (1993). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1461 (noting that over a dozen officers watched the beating of Rodney King 
without assisting him or intervening). 
 24. Steven P. Ragland, Using the Master’s Tools: Fighting Persistent Police Misconduct 
with Civil RICO, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 142 (2001). 
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connection with the scandal.25 The recent conviction of five New Orleans 
police officers for their crimes related to the Danziger Bridge shooting is also 
illustrative of an institutional culture of police misconduct and corruption. In 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, officers fired upon several unarmed citizens 
crossing Danziger Bridge, killing two victims, one of whom was shot in the 
back of the head, and wounding four others.26 An investigation revealed that 
numerous officers actively participated in the shooting, but several other 
officers, some of them supervisors, participated in an elaborate effort to 
conceal the wrongdoing of those involved in the shooting.27 
Recently, allegations of systemic police misconduct regarding allegations 
of racial profiling have surfaced in Maricopa County, Arizona and East Eden, 
Connecticut. Based upon an investigation that began in 2008, the DOJ found 
that the Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office (“MCSO”) engaged in a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional racial profiling.28 The federal government recently 
filed suit against the MCSO accusing it of “discriminatory and otherwise 
unconstitutional law-enforcement actions against Latinos.”29 After 
 
 25. Id. at 143–44 (explaining the results of the post-Rampart criminal trials); See also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los 
Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 308 (2001) (noting that over one hundred convictions had 
been overturned because of prosecutors use of tainted or falsified evidence); see also Laurie 
Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) 
(explaining that very few of the seventy-seven officers originally identified as part of the Los 
Angeles Rampart Scandal were ever found guilty of criminal misconduct). 
 26. Ex-Cop Pleads Guilty in Katrina Bridge Shooting Cover-Up, CNN JUSTICE (Feb. 24, 
2010, 10:58 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-24/justice/katrina.cop.charges_1_danziger-
bridge-police-officers-new-orleans-police?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 27. Richard Fausset, Five Police Convicted in Post-Katrina Shootings, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
2011, at A7 (reporting that Sergeants Kenneth Bowen, Robert Gisevius, Archie Kaufman and 
Officers Anthony Villavaso and Robert Faulcon were found guilty). Five other officers of the 
New Orleans Police Department pled guilty to numerous charges linked to the cover-up: 
Lieutenant Michael Lohman, Detective Jeffrey Lehrman, and Officers Michael Hunter, Robert 
Barrios, and Ignatius Hill. 5 Officers convicted in post-Katrina shootings, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 
5, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-20088708.html. Sergeant Gerard 
Dugue faces trial in September for his role. Id. For a summary of the various charges and the 
officers’ roles, see Third Officer Pleads Guilty in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/us/08shooting.html; Ex-Police Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up 
of Louisiana Bridge Shooting, CNN JUSTICE (Mar. 11, 2010, 1:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/20 
10/CRIME/03/11/nopd.shooting/index.html?iref=allsearch (“Lehrmann also admitted he helped 
compile a false report on the incidents, and was with others when they planted a gun as part of the 
cover-up, according to court documents.”). 
 28. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill 
Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney, Maricopa Cnty. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/mcso.php. 
 29. Jerry Seper, Justice Dept. accuses Ariz. Sheriff Arpaio of racial profiling, THE WASH. 
TIMES (May 10, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/10/justice-department-
plans-sue-ariz-sheriff-arpaio/print/. 
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interviewing over four hundred people and reviewing thousands of pages of 
documents, DOJ found that “through the actions of its deputies, supervisory 
staff, and command staff,” the MCSO engaged in a pattern of discriminatory 
conduct.30 
None of the aforementioned instances of police misconduct or corruption 
could have occurred without complex cooperation between wrongdoers at 
various levels. Although widely publicized, these instances serve as a 
barometer of police culture throughout the nation, and several reports have 
noted that police misconduct is a problem in many major police departments.31 
Each of these instances demonstrates that the problems are institutional in 
nature, and not simply the work of a few bad apples.32 Institutional problems 
necessitate institutional remedies, and policymakers have focused on 
identifying characteristics of modern police culture in order to develop and 
implement suitable remedies.33 
There are numerous factors, such as the police code of silence, lax 
supervision, and a pervasive belief that violence is a necessary part of police 
work that contribute to an organizational culture of police misconduct.34 
Similarly, the lack of clear policies and the failure to implement effective 
accountability measures further exacerbate the problems that can arise and 
contribute to what DOJ described as a “chronic culture of disregard for basic 
legal and constitutional obligations” in the case of Maricopa County.35 The 
following section describes some of the common cultural characteristics of 
police institutions that contribute to the culture DOJ describes. 
2. Factors Contributing to Patterns of Police Misconduct 
It is well established that a “code of silence” exists among many police 
officers working in the same department.36 This code of silence, also known as 
 
 30. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 28, at 2. 
 31. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 16, at 1, 27, 323. 
 32. See id. at 1, 37, 45 (reporting that many of the problems identified in police departments 
across the nation had an organizational component); see also Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the 
Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 
17, 63–65 (2000) (noting that the “code of silence” protects officers who “violate civil rights 
through violence or other misconduct”); see also Armacost, supra note 1, at 501–02 (explaining 
that lax supervision of officers “fuel[s] a police culture that . . . fosters and protects corruption 
and brutality” and that the tolerance of force, such as “excessive fists to the face and . . . knees to 
the groin were the realities of policing”) (quoting MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 49). 
 33. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 4. 
 34. Simmons, supra note 1, at 381–82 (noting that the “blue wall of silence,” inadequate 
supervision, and the widespread of belief of the necessity of violence were the primary factors in 
fostering an organizational culture of police misconduct). 
 35. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 28, at 2. 
 36. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 70 F. Supp. 2d 300, 333–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting 
that the “blue wall of silence” prevents officers from notifying supervisors of police misconduct 
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the “blue wall of silence,” discourages officers who witness the misconduct of 
other officers to report that wrongdoing.37 Officers who violate this unwritten 
rule find themselves in precarious situations, having breached this duty of 
loyalty to their fellow officers.38 The code of silence is closely linked to police 
perjury, a practice that many actors in the judicial system see as widespread.39 
The Mollen Commission found that police perjury, which includes a range of 
activity such as supplying false testimony in court or planting evidence on 
victims, was “probably the most common form of police corruption facing the 
criminal justice system.”40 
In addition to the code of silence, several commissions examining the issue 
have found that aggressive policing styles are common in many local police 
departments. The Mollen Commission, for example, reported that even though 
many officers disapproved of physical violence against suspects, many officers 
tolerated brutality.41 In addition to the code of silence and aggressive policing 
styles, ineffective supervision and inadequate discipline contribute to an 
organizational police culture that facilitates police misconduct.42 When 
examining the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”), the Christopher 
Commission reported that there was a large number of officers within the 
 
that occurs within their unit or precinct); McLin v. City of Chi., 742 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 
1990) (finding a cause of action based on allegations that the “code of silence” hindered police 
investigations into officer misconduct); see also Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the 
Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 
211, 213–14 (2000) (explaining that the “blue wall of silence” is pervasive among police 
departments and is source of pressure on police officers). 
 37. Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to 
Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 410 (1999) (explaining that the “blue wall of 
silence” prevents officers from reporting misconduct); see also John Powers, Jr., Eroding the 
Blue Wall of Silence: The Need for an Internal Affairs Privilege of Confidentiality, 5 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 19, 27 (2000) (describing the widespread nature of the “blue wall of 
silence” and how it hinders investigations into police misconduct by preventing officers from 
reporting cases of misconduct). 
 38. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and 
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 240 (1998) (noting 
that the repercussions that officers who break the code of silence face could jeopardize their 
careers and even their lives); Koepke, supra note 36, at 233 (explaining that officers who report 
misconduct in violation of the “blue wall of silence” face repercussions from other officers in the 
form of threats, isolation, and persecution); see also Domenech v. City of N.Y.C., 919 F. Supp. 
702, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that Plaintiff was informed that she would not receive any 
assistance if she was ever in trouble on the street if she broke the code of silence). 
 39. Chin & Wells, supra note 38, at 240. 
 40. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 36. 
 41. See id. at 49. 
 42. Simmons, supra note 1, at 388; see also Armacost, supra note 1, at 527; see also 
Levenson, supra note 25, at 15–16 (noting that problems in the supervision of officers has been a 
contributing factor in police misconduct scandals). 
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LAPD who repeatedly used excessive force against the public.43 The 
Christopher Commission’s report noted that department management 
condoned this behavior through “a pattern of lax supervision and inadequate 
investigation of complaints.”44 Many of the officers who had received 
complaints had been promoted or received positive performance evaluations.45 
The Commission found that the LAPD “apparently had no overall system or 
plan for keeping track of more generalized data involving officer uses of force, 
excessive or otherwise.”46 Among other things, the LAPD lacked: (1) 
important features such as an auditing procedure for use of force reports; (2) a 
mechanism to monitor force-related civil damages suits and settlements for 
training and discipline; and (3) a method to systematically review officers who 
had multiple complaints alleging excessive uses of force.47 
Historically, there have been numerous methods to address police 
misconduct. Reformers have advocated the exclusionary rule, civil and 
criminal suits against police officers, internal police investigations, and the 
utilization of citizen complaint review boards to hold police officers 
accountable for misconduct.48 These measures play a critical role in the effort 
to deter police misconduct, but none of these remedial measures, which are all 
adjudicatory in nature, have shown promise in preventing future patterns of 
misconduct.49 Thus, these traditional remedies to address police misconduct 
 
 43. Armacost, supra note 1, at 527. See generally CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 
16, at iii–iv (stating “[t]he failure to control these officers is a management issue that is at the 
heart of the problem. The documents and data that we have analyzed have all been available to 
the department; indeed, most of this information came from that source. The LAPD’s failure to 
analyze and act upon these revealing data evidences a significant breakdown in the management 
and leadership of the Department. The Police Commission, lacking investigators or other 
resources, failed in its duty to monitor the Department in this sensitive use of force area.”). 
 44. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on 
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 815, 816 (1999) (discussing the Omnibus 
Crime Control Act of 1991 and the Police Accountability Act). 
 45. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 40–47 (noting that the performance 
reports of police officers tended to document every type of compliment and commendation while 
failing to record even sustained complaint or give any details about any complaints received). 
 46. Armacost, supra note 1, at 497. 
 47. Simmons, supra note 1, at 389; see also id. at 498–99 (noting that the LAPD’s 
organizational culture had a promotion system that rewarded illegal force and a management 
policy that failed to supervise officer’s use of force). 
 48. See Levenson, supra note 25, at 18–24. 
 49. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 378, 389 (discussing the shortcomings of various methods 
to address police misconduct); see also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform 
Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1384, 1399–1401 (2000); see also Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 771–72 (1993) (noting 
that traditional methods to address police misconduct fail because the cost borne by individual 
actors is minimal). 
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have proved inadequate to address the systemic change that many police 
departments desperately need.50 
B. The Federal Government’s Role in Systemic Police Reform 
1. The Genesis of DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority: 42. U.S.C. § 
14141 
Recognizing the institutional nature of police misconduct and the limits of 
the traditional remedies, in 1994, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141.51 This 
legislation granted DOJ the authority to seek widespread institutional reforms 
within local police departments that have displayed a pattern or practice of 
constitutional violations.52 Section 14141’s emphasis on structural reform 
differentiates it from the other methods because the primary focus is to 
implement reforms that will alleviate a pattern of constitutional violations.53 
Pursuant to Section 14141, DOJ can initiate an investigation into a police 
department based on citizen complaints, private lawsuits, or other information 
that might indicate a pattern of abuse.54 If DOJ finds a “pattern or practice” of 
constitutional violations after its investigation, it has the authority to sue the 
police department for injunctive relief.55 Although DOJ has the authority to 
initiate lawsuits, none of the investigations have resulted in litigation, and most 
have been solved through consent decrees, memoranda of agreement, or 
technical assistance letters.56 The consent decrees and memoranda of 
agreement generally require departments to implement systemic reforms with 
the goal of improving a wide range of policies and practices across the broader 
police institution.57 Common requirements or recommendations for reforms 
 
 50. Levenson, supra note 25, at 25. 
 51. Simmons, supra note 1, at 392–93; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights 
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009). 
 52. See Harmon, supra note 51, at 13–14 (noting that the Special Litigation Section in the 
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division has the power to bring suit against law enforcement 
agencies, which demonstrate patterns or practices of civil rights violations); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
14141(a)–(b) (2006). 
 53. Harmon, supra note 51, at 13. 
 54. Id. at 14 (noting the Special Litigation Section is the specific entity within DOJ that 
conducts these investigations and suggests reforms). 
 55. Id. at 16. 
 56. Id. at 15. 
 57. Id. at 17–21, 50–54 (noting that although the legislation grants the U.S. government the 
ability to sue, under the Clinton Administration, the several investigations culminated in either 
negotiated consent decrees or memoranda of agreement; during former President’s Bush’s tenure, 
DOJ did not file any lawsuits, but merely issued “technical assistance” letters to the offending 
jurisdictions, technical assistance letters generally set forth similar recommendations but are not 
court-enforceable; however, the Obama Administration has been slightly more aggressive in 
opening investigations). 
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pursuant to Section 14141 have included implementing an early warning 
tracking system to identify problem officers, developing or improving use of 
force policies, developing or implementing structures for citizen complaints, 
and improving training programs.58 The goal of each of these substantive 
recommendations is to achieve greater transparency and accountability in order 
to address the problematic cultural aspects discussed above. 
2. Critiques of Section 14141 
Despite the promise of DOJ’s efforts to systemically reform police 
agencies through its pattern or practice authority, there are numerous critiques 
of the legislation. First, despite the grant of authority to sue offending police 
departments, DOJ is necessarily limited in its enforcement of Section 14141.59 
Scarce resources ensure that only a limited number of police departments will 
be held accountable for their patterns of unconstitutional violations pursuant to 
Section 14141.60 The Special Ligation Section employs only a certain number 
of attorneys and funding for investigations is not unlimited.61 It is therefore 
impractical to initiate an investigation in every local police department that 
might necessitate reform.62 Second, concerns about the federal government 
seeking to change the practices of local police departments implicate important 
federalism concerns.63 A particular administration may find it politically 
unfeasible to aggressively enforce the pattern or practice. Finally, the lack of 
community involvement, in addition to exacerbating the federalism concerns, 
threatens both the legitimacy of the reform process and the ability to ensure 
 
 58. Consent Decree at ¶ 12, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
29, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/pittssa.php (ordering the 
city to implement an “early warning system” to monitor complaint prone officers and appointing 
the Office of Municipal Investigations (“OMI”) to investigate and permanently store all citizen 
complaints); Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and D.C., ¶¶ 38, 40, 
41 (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcm 
oa.php#_1_5 (mandating that Metropolitan police implement force policy reforms, such as 
defining and identifying the types of force and the situations in which they can be used, including 
when a weapon may be drawn, and maintaining a uniform database to record all weapon 
discharges); Consent Decree at 54–55, 56, United States v. City of L.A., No. 00-11769 GAF 
(C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_de 
cree.pdf (requiring LAPD include in its training subjects such as: misconduct and retaliation, 
cultural diversity, Fourth Amendment, and other constitutional issues, as well as to provide 
supervisory training). 
 59. Harmon, supra note 51, at 3–4. 
 60. Id. at 3. 
 61. Id. at 21. 
 62. Id. at 21–22. 
 63. Kami C. Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional 
Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 376–80 (2011). 
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long-term sustainable reform.64 As currently implemented, the federal 
government’s response to institutional police misconduct via Section 14141 
does not adequately reflect the ideals of community policing, a model of 
policing built upon the premise that local residents and police officers should 
collaborate to problem solve and set criminal justice priorities for the 
community.65 
Thus, including a provision in the agreements that would allow citizens to 
be involved in the recruitment and hiring process is one step toward providing 
more local participation in these agreements. This Article argues that one of 
the most important ways in which the community can become involved is in 
the selection and hiring of the officers that serve their communities.66 Such a 
role for community members may be beneficial in any community, but 
participating in this context is particularly important where the police 
department has been identified as exhibiting a pattern of police misconduct.67 
Since the federal government has embraced the philosophy of community 
policing,68 it is inconsistent that the provisions in the consent decrees and 
agreements do not reflect a commitment to actively engage community 
members.69 A proposal to incorporate provisions involving citizens in the 
hiring and recruitment process directly addresses the concern that there is a 
lack of stakeholder participation in DOJ’s reform process. 
II.  COMMUNITY POLICING/COPS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO STAKEHOLDER 
PARTICIPATION 
A. Principles of Community Policing 
Perhaps the greatest example of organizational reform in the policing 
context has been the shift from the “reform-era” policing model to the 
community-policing model.70 In contrast to reform-era police, who were 
 
 64. Simmons, supra note 1, at 416. 
 65. Id. (noting that federal use of Section 14141 is a departure from the traditional pattern of 
local reform and takes a top down approach that lacks any way for civilians in the community to 
influence the reform). 
 66. See infra notes 102–51 and accompanying text. 
 67. Kami C. Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the 
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 496–
97 (noting that due to the institutional nature of police violence, traditional reform methods are 
inadequate). 
 68. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 69. Simmons, supra note 67, at 519–20. 
 70. There are three generally recognized eras in policing. The “Political Era” was marked by 
a close relationship between police and political machines that controlled communities. During 
this era, police officers operated in decentralized units and the rampant corruption prevalent 
during this era has been attributed to the close ties between police and community leaders. For a 
description of the various eras of policing in the United States, see ROY ROBERG ET AL., POLICE 
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characterized as being reactive to incidents and detached from the community, 
community-oriented police officers are expected to regularly engage with the 
community and collaborate on initiatives to improve public safety.71 The 
concept of community policing is generally defined as “a philosophy that 
promotes organizational strategies which support the systemic use of 
partnerships and problem solving techniques, to proactively address the 
immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues.”72 Community 
policing requires cooperation from various sectors of the community including, 
“civic and business leaders, public and private agencies, residents, churches, 
schools, and hospitals.”73 Community policing developed from the concept of 
“problem-oriented policing” advanced by Herman Goldstein, who argued that 
in order to resolve issues of crime in a community, officers would need to 
identify the underlying causes of the problems that lead to repeated incidents.74 
The underlying rationale for the community-policing model is consistent 
with democratic theories that advocate stakeholder participation. Scholars have 
long argued “citizens should participate in the design and implementation of 
the policies that affect them.”75 In the context of policing, the historical 
inability to participate and the marginalization of some sectors of society had a 
detrimental impact on vulnerable groups, particularly members of racial 
minority groups.76 Racial profiling and disproportionate stops and arrests in 
marginalized neighborhoods are holdovers from this bygone era.77 Community 
 
AND SOCIETY 39 (4th ed. 2009) (describing the various eras of policing in the United States); see 
also GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 70 (1997). Efforts to reform these corrupt 
police departments, hence the moniker “reform-era” policing, emphasized a sharp division 
between police and the public. Id. 
 71. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 8, at vii (explaining that community 
policing is predicated on police-citizen interaction and collaboration). 
 72. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT RECRUITMENT TOOLKIT: COPS LEADERSHIP PROJECT vi (2009) [hereinafter 
COPS LEADERSHIP PROJECT], available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e080921223-
RecruitmentToolkit.pdf. 
 73. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 8, at 4. 
 74. See Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 236, 241–43 (1979). 
 75. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to 
Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 175 (2004). 
 76. Simmons, supra note 1, at 409. 
 77. Keith O. Lawrence, Changing the Public Common Sense About Crime & Punishment, in 
RACE, CRIME, & PUNISHMENT: BREAKING THE CONNECTION IN AMERICA 189 (Keith O. 
Lawrence ed. 2011). 
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policing, in many ways, represents the “counter-reaction” to the power 
imbalances that previously existed.78 
B. Federal Support for Community Policing 
An overwhelming majority of major police departments now engage in 
community policing, and the federal government has played a critical role in 
financing, developing, and implementing community-policing programs in 
local police departments.79 The Community Oriented Policing Services 
(“COPS”) was a critical component of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994.80 This program fulfilled then-President Bill 
Clinton’s promise to put one-hundred thousand additional police officers on 
America’s streets.81 Section 3796dd(a) grants the United States Attorney 
General the power to “make[] grants to States, units of local government, 
Indian tribal governments, other public and private entities, and multi-
jurisdictional or regional consortia.”82 In addition to establishing community-
oriented policing programs, the grants may be used for numerous purposes 
related to law enforcement. This includes, among other things, rehiring law 
enforcement officers who have been laid off; hiring and training new officers 
for deployment in community-oriented policing; purchasing equipment, 
technology, and support systems to assist in community-oriented policing; 
training police to enhance their service to communities; and purchasing service 
weapons.83 
In October 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced the opening of 
the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.84 
This entity would administer the grants to hire additional police officers and 
oversee the expansion of community-policing programs.85 The initial mandate 
of COPS was to achieve four goals: (1) to increase the number of community-
 
 78. See Michael Dorf, Drug Treatment Courts & Emergent Experimentalist Governments, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 855 (noting that community policing is a counter-reaction of historical 
power imbalances). 
 79. See Meares, supra note 6, at 1597 (noting that by 1999 64 percent of local police 
departments serving 85 percent of all residents engaged in community policing). 
 80. JERRY H. RATCLIFFE, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE 
& CRIME ANALYSIS: ENHANCED INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
LEADERS ii (2007). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (2006). See also 140 CONG. REC. S43-03, S-47 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 
1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1994-01-25/html/CREC-1994-01-25-
pt1-PgS31.htm (statement of President Clinton). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd(a). 
 83. See id. § 3796dd(b)(1)–(17) for a full listing of the purposes for which entities may use 
COPS grants. 
 84. Meares, supra note 6, at 1596. 
 85. Id. (noting that the Department of Justice would open an office to handle police-hiring 
grants and issues related to community policing). 
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policing officers by one-hundred thousand; (2) to promote community policing 
in the United States; (3) to help local police agencies develop management 
infrastructure that could support and sustain community policing after federal 
funding ended; and (4) to demonstrate that community-policing techniques 
could significantly reduce violence, crime, and disorder in communities.86 
Each year, COPS provides millions of dollars to local and state agencies for 
law enforcement initiatives.87 Since 1994, COPS has distributed over $12 
billion of federal money to states.88 Although the Bush Administration 
drastically reduced funding for COPS,89 in March 2009, Attorney General Eric 
Holder announced an infusion of $1 billion of funds to revitalize the 
program.90 For the FY 2010, President Obama requested $761 million, while 
Congress approved $791.6 million.91 In FY 2011, President Obama requested 
$690 million, but Congress only approved $603.2 million.92 
As discussed above, the federal government’s efforts to reform some 
police departments pursuant to Section 14141 have not explicitly included an 
adequate mechanism for community involvement in the reform of police 
practices. Inserting a role for community members would be consistent with 
the tenets of community policing, and fully integrating the structural reform 
model with stakeholder participation might have vast implications for changing 
a law enforcement agency’s organizational culture. Policymakers, from both 
the federal and local levels, should examine various ways in which the goals of 
organizational police reform could be infused with community participation, 
and explore the implications of such a relationship. An integral part of COPS 
has been an emphasis on hiring and training officers to implement community 
 
 86. Id. at 1596–97 (citing OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, COPS OFFICE REPORT: 100,000 OFFICERS AND COMMUNITY POLICING ACROSS THE 
NATION 3 (1997)). 
 87. COPS is the “principal federal program that supports police manning at the state and 
local levels.” P.J. Crowley, Homeland Security and the Upcoming Transition: What the Next 
Administration Should Do to Make Us Safe at Home, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 302 (2008). 
 88. See COPS: CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2013). 
 89. Crowley, supra note 87, at 302. For example, in FY 2005, the Bush Administration 
requested $97 million for the COPS program, which represented a 41 percent reduction from its 
previous request and was 91 percent below the amount that Congress appropriated in FY 2003. 
Id. at 302 n.57. 
 90. See Press Release, White House, U.S. Department of Justice Makes Available $1 Billion 
in Recovery Act Funds for COPS Program (Mar. 16, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 5062463 
(explaining that the COPS Program would make available $1 billion in grants for local 
governments to hire or retain law enforcement officers). 
 91. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES 
(COPS): BACKGROUND AND FUNDING 6 tbl.A-1 (2011). 
 92. Id. 
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policing.93 Engaging the community in this aspect of organizational change for 
police departments would be a significant step to allowing a role for the 
community. The following section suggests that DOJ’s pattern or practice 
cases may represent one vehicle for marrying these principles underlying 
community policing and organizational police reform. 
III.  BENEFITS OF ENCOURAGING COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT THROUGH 
SECTION 14141 AND COPS 
The federal government has strongly supported the community-policing 
model through its funding of initiatives and the grants awarded via COPS.94 
Embracing this philosophy over traditional policing models that kept the public 
and the police separate represented a seismic shift in the way many local law 
enforcement agencies deliver their services.95 During this shift to community 
policing, the federal government simultaneously supported organizational 
change of police departments through its pattern or practice authority pursuant 
to Section 14141.96 As a result of this pattern or practice authority, several of 
the nation’s most troubled police departments entered into agreements or 
consent decrees to change their practices to allow for greater transparency and 
accountability.97 However, there has not been a comprehensive effort to fuse 
the two strategies by allowing community representatives a greater role in 
fashioning the organizational changes that can occur pursuant to Section 
14141.98 There are many ways in which the community could become 
involved in the process of organizational reform. One proposal to bridge the 
two ideals embodied by community policing and organizational police reform 
would be to have any agreements between DOJ and the affected police 
department ensure a role for community representatives in the recruitment and 
selection of police officers. 
A. Community Policing Necessitates Community Involvement at All Levels 
The shift toward the model of community policing has significant 
implications for the selection and recruitment of police officers. Unlike the 
reform-era policemen, modern police officers are no longer expected to simply 
react to reports of crime and effectuate arrests.99 Today’s police officers, 
particularly those operating in departments purportedly supporting the 
 
 93. Id. at 1. 
 94. Id. at 6 tbl.A-1. 
 95. Dorf, supra note 78, at 855. 
 96. 42 U.S.C § 14141 (2006). 
 97. Simmons, supra note 63, at 371–72. 
 98. Id. at 373. 
 99. CHARLES B. SAUNDERS, JR., UPGRADING THE AMERICAN POLICE: EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING FOR BETTER LAW ENFORCEMENT 19–21 (1970). 
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community-policing model, have greater ongoing contact with the 
community.100 To carry out the goal of problem-solving and help establish 
priorities for the community’s public safety, “community-oriented” police 
officers are expected to have a greater understanding of the underlying causes 
of human behavior, be equipped to make good value judgments, demonstrate 
leadership, communicate effectively, and be more prone to engage in problem 
solving rather than violence.101 Thus, changing the model of policing should 
also include changing the methods of selection and hiring for police officers. 
The importance of recruiting and selecting quality personnel is an important 
part of an effective police department, and policymakers should encourage 
police departments to develop innovations in police hiring.102 In this context, 
the collaboration between citizens and police, and the possibilities for 
organizational change begin at the earliest possible moment—the recruitment 
and hiring of police officers. 
1. Community Engagement May Result in Increased Legitimacy and 
Collaboration 
Allowing community members to become actively involved in the 
recruitment and selection of the officers policing their community embodies 
the spirit of community policing. The federal government has supported 
innovative methods to involve community members in hiring officers for local 
police departments.103 There are myriad benefits of including community 
members in the recruitment and hiring of police officers, many of which are 
consistent with the benefits of stakeholder participation discussed above.104 For 
example, in addition to increasing public visibility and avoiding the duplication 
of individual efforts, one report issued by the COPS office noted that 
“[c]ollaboration will enhance the power of advocacy and resource 
development.”105 The report also noted collaboration will create the possibility 
for future collaboration between citizens and police.106 Additionally, this report 
 
 100. Id. at 18. 
 101. Id. at 82–83. 
 102. COPS LEADERSHIP PROJECT, supra note 72, at 75. 
 (noting that recruitment and selection is “one of the most critical elements in determining success 
[of a police department]”). 
 103. Definitions of “community” can be difficult to articulate and there are several different 
schools of thought on which members should be considered the “community,” but the COPS 
office has identified several categories of stakeholders including business owners, clergy, elected 
officials, homeowner associations, media, military, minority advocacy groups, neighborhood 
watch leaders, schools, volunteers, social service organizations, and youth organizations. Id. at 
76–78. 
 104. Id. at 75–76. 
 105. Id. at 75. 
 106. Id. 
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stressed the unique attributes that community members can bring to the 
selection process, noting “[c]ommunity representatives can provide a better 
understanding of cultural impediments to successful participation in the 
selection process.”107 Notably, the COPS office also emphasized that the 
community’s role in this context should not be limited to recruiting police 
officers, but that “[c]itizens should also have a voice at the selection step.”108 
B. Community Engagement in Hiring May Assist in Efforts to Racially 
Diversify Police Departments 
Another concern when recruiting police officers is the challenge of 
maintaining a diverse police force. Thus, in addition to the benefits of 
collaboration, allowing the community an active role in recruitment may help 
recruit more minority applicants.109 Many police departments struggle to 
recruit a workforce that reflects the racial and ethnic diversity of the 
community.110 The need to racially diversify police departments has been a 
priority for many police departments, and increasing racial diversity may help 
achieve legitimacy among the minority communities.111 For example, a Bureau 
of Justice Statistics report found that 70 percent of white respondents had a 
“great deal” of confidence in the police as compared to only 41 percent of 
black respondents.112 When asked whether the police treated blacks as fairly as 
they treat whites, 34 percent of whites disagreed, but an overwhelming 
majority, 76 percent of blacks, disagreed.113 So it is fair to say that whatever is 
actually happening, many racial minorities have a negative perception of 
police.114 When surveyed, even police officers themselves agree that racial bias 
 
 107. Id. at 8. 
 108. COPS LEADERSHIP PROJECT, supra note 72, at 8. 
 109. Id. at 7–8. 
 110. See JEREMY M. WILSON & CLIFFORD A. GRAMMICH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., POLICE RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY URBAN ENVIRONMENT 2 (2009); see also COPS LEADERSHIP PROJECT, supra 
note 72, at 5. 
 111. Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that a 
racially diverse police department may enhance effective law enforcement by fostering public 
support and confidence among minority communities). 
 112. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
2003, at 113 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2005). 
 113. Racial Discrimination: Obama, Gates and the Police, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2009, 9:35 
AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/07/racial-discrimination-obama-gates-and-the-
police (citing an ABC/Post poll which also found that 74 percent of African-Americans believed 
that they were unfairly treated by police, compared to only 30 percent of whites). 
 114. See Keith D. Parker et al., African Americans’ Attitudes Towards the Local Police: A 
Multivariate Analysis, 25 J. BLACK STUD. 396, 405 (1995) (noting that historically, numerous 
studies have demonstrated that blacks are more critical of the police than whites); see also Meera 
Adya et al., Cultural Differences in Perceptions of the Government and the Legal System: 
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on the part of officers toward minority citizens currently exists and contributes 
to a negative interaction between police and the community.115 
Historically, police departments in the United States have been 
homogenous institutions. The majority of police officers were traditionally 
predominately white, male, and from working-class backgrounds.116 Many of 
the tensions that exist between law-enforcement agents and racial and ethnic 
minorities can be attributed to this lack of racial diversity and the detachment 
of officers from the communities they serve.117 Racial diversity in American 
police departments, however, has significantly increased over the last few 
decades.118 As David Sklansky notes, “[i]n 1970, blacks made up somewhere 
around six percent of sworn officers in the three hundred or so largest 
American police departments; today, that figure is around eighteen percent.”119 
 
Hurricane Katrina Highlights What has Been There All Along, 8 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 27, 
35 (2006) (describing a 1998 Gallup Poll which found that African-Americans perceive racial 
disparities in policing and believe that they are targets of police); see also Erik Luna, Transparent 
Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1157 (2000) (noting that many minorities harbor grave distrust 
of police officers and that there is a widespread belief in African-American communities that 
police are unfair and prejudiced against minorities). 
 115. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 390 (1998), 
citing CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 16, at 69 (finding that approximately 25 percent of 
the officers surveyed believed that police officers have a racial bias). 
 116. See David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New 
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1210 (2006) 
(reporting that historically, police departments were mostly all-white and all-male); see also 
Frank R. Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 692 (noting that most policeman come from working-class 
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Despite the importance of a racially diverse police force, out of the 668,000 
police and sheriff’s patrol officers, African-Americans only constitute 11.5 
percent of the officers.120 Increasing the number of minority police officers 
may help ameliorate some of the tension that historically existed between 
police and racial minorities.121 Similarly, as David Sklansky argues, the 
demographic changes in America’s police departments have had a positive 
impact on many of the organizational shortcomings of police departments. 122 
He notes that, “[p]olice effectiveness does not appear to have suffered, a range 
of police pathologies have been ameliorated, and police reform has grown 
easier and less perilous.”123 In particular, Sklansky notes that the resulting 
decline in the solidarity and cohesiveness of officers actually “makes the 
internal cultures of police departments less stifling, and it opens up space for 
dissent and disagreement.”124 
Increased legitimacy and the possibility of increasing racial diversity are 
not only important factors for changing the organizational and institutional 
culture of the police department, but they are also consistent with the goals of 
community policing.125 Recognizing the numerous benefits of community 
inclusion, the federal government has funded, through the COPS office, several 
initiatives to fund and develop models for community engagement in the hiring 
process.126 However, these ideals have not been reflected in federal efforts to 
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change the institutional culture of police departments.127 Greater incentives are 
needed to unite the goals of organizational reform of local police departments 
and stakeholder participation in selecting the officers. The following section 
discusses specific examples of how several police departments have partnered 
with community members and engaged them in the task of police recruiting. 
These initiatives could serve as models to other police departments nationwide. 
C. Specific Examples of Community Engagement in Hiring and Recruiting 
Police Officers 
The federal government has funded several efforts to assist local police 
departments in developing innovative officer recruitment programs that 
emphasize community involvement. For example, part of the federal money 
provided through the COPS program is directed to hiring police officers.128 
The COPS office reported that $111 million would be available through the 
COPS Hiring Program, a program that provides funding to hire and train police 
officers.129 
The federal government has also funded specific programs that have 
involved engaging community members in the hiring process.130 For example, 
Hiring in the Spirit of Service (“HSS”) was a federally funded project in which 
several police departments actively encouraged members of the community to 
participate in recruiting and hiring service-oriented police officers.131 The goal 
of the project was to assist the participating agencies in recruiting and hiring 
service-oriented law enforcement officers, and the project “placed a heavy 
premium on increasing community involvement in all facets of [police 
recruitment].”132 Underlying the rationale for the project was the recognition 
that “[w]hen organizational philosophy shifts, . . . it calls into question whether 
the traditional models that have been used to recruit and hire are sufficient to 
support the requirements of the new community policing model.”133 
The participating agencies in the HSS project included Burlington, 
Vermont; Sacramento, California; Detroit, Michigan; Hillsborough County, 
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Florida; and King County, Washington.134 Each of these departments 
attempted to meaningfully involve citizens in the recruitment and selection 
process, and a stated objective was to “bring community policing values and 
expectations directly into the recruitment and selection process.”135 The HSS 
project found that there are several core competencies modern police officers 
need to effectively fulfill their duties.136 The core competencies include the 
ability to use good judgment and to problem solve, the capacity for empathy 
and compassion, the capacity to engage in teamwork and the ability to 
collaborate, the capacity to multi-task, and the possession and demonstration of 
integrity.137 One common feature of the sites that participated in the program 
was that, in various ways and to various degrees, they actively engaged 
members of the community in the recruitment and selection process.138 In 
2005, Sacramento pioneered a program to include the community in the 
recruitment process in order to attract a more diverse police force.139 In 
Sacramento, Captain Kevin Johnson, who is credited with helping to develop 
the program, sought to enlist the help of community leaders in the recruitment 
process.140 The police department trained community leaders during a one-day 
course, told them what type of recruit the department sought, gave them a 
recruiter handbook, and a checklist of attributes of a strong candidate.141 The 
hope was that these trained community leaders would help find officers in their 
racial and ethnic circles.142 Community involvement did not stop at the 
recruitment stage in this program.143 Community recruiters sponsored 
candidates through the police academy, and met regularly with the recruit and 
his or her family to offer support.144 On graduation day, the community 
recruiter pinned the badge onto the recruit, which signified the recruit’s entry 
into the police force.145 Finally, the officer was not assigned to any community, 
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but rather, his own community.146 The results from the Sacramento experiment 
were mixed. The Sacramento Police Department had trouble increasing 
diversity, and the majority of recruits were still white males.147 There is little 
other information publicly available about the outcomes of these programs and 
whether they were successful. Undoubtedly, more study is needed to articulate 
measures for a successful program. 
The HSS project also had an impact in Detroit. Through the project, the 
Detroit Police Department expanded its already existing Recruiting 
Ambassadors Program, and offered incentives for police and community 
representatives whose recruits completed the recruitment process.148 The 
Detroit Police Department had previously involved the community in 
recruiting efforts.149 For example, the department allowed community 
members to participate in interview panels, but the community members did 
not have the same opportunity, as the sworn officers on the panel, to rate the 
candidates.150 After implementation of the HSS project, the scores of the 
community members were averaged with the three scores from the sworn panel 
members; thus, the community members truly had an ability to impact a 
candidate’s score.151 Several of the other sites allowed community members to 
participate in the candidates’ oral interviews.152 By the end of the HHS project, 
several of the sites were in the process of developing interview process guides 
to ensure appropriate questions, as well as to develop standardized questions 
that would strengthen reliability of independent interview ratings.153 To bring 
legitimacy to the police reform process, these models could be replicated and 
implemented in jurisdictions that the government has identified as exhibiting a 
pattern or practice of constitutional violations. If citizens have a stake in 
selecting new officers, they may have more support for the reforms. And there 
is a chance that the new recruits, chosen through this process, will be more 
willing to engage community members and less likely to replicate patterns of 
insularity common among local law-enforcement agencies. 
IV.  MAKING IT WORK: QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The recruitment and selection of new police officers represents one way to 
begin changing the institutional culture of law-enforcement agencies. Police 
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departments are increasingly concerned with transparency and accountability, 
as well as an ability to ensure public safety without the threat of violence in 
order to legitimize their efforts to promote partnerships between citizens and 
police.154 There are many characteristics that might be important to consider 
when choosing a police officer suitable to implement the ideals of community 
policing. However, the process of how these officers are selected may be 
equally important. Involving community members in the selection and 
recruitment of police officers represents one way to infuse the principle of 
community policing and the “new paradigm” of policing. 
Although there are many possible benefits, there are also several valid 
concerns about such a proposal. First, even though the pattern or practice cases 
represent a mechanism by which to encourage community involvement, it is 
certainly not the only way. Recall that one of the major criticisms of the pattern 
or practice suits is DOJ’s limited capacity to reach all of the departments that 
are in need of change.155 Although DOJ’s inclusion of a recommendation to 
include the community in recruiting and hiring would reach only a few police 
departments, many other police departments may begin to look to this as a 
model or best practice. Furthermore, DOJ’s agreements pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141 have always included the provision of an independent monitor that 
oversees the implementation of the agreement.156 If this practice continues, the 
monitors’ reports could provide valuable information about the challenges of 
implementation, as well as tenets of a successful program. 
Another likely criticism of a proposal to involve the community in hiring is 
that creating closer community ties by involving the community in the 
selection process could actually lead to more corruption. It is, after all, the 
close relationship between the community and resulting patronage that was 
responsible for corruption in the “political era,” and the resulting backlash that 
ushered in the “reform-era.”157 Corruption is a serious concern, but the 
possibility should not foreclose the involvement of community representatives 
in selecting the individuals who will be charged with enforcing the laws in 
those communities. There are several practical ways to avoid this corruption. 
First, those implementing these programs will have to think carefully about the 
criteria they use to select the community representatives, and ensure that these 
representatives are clear about their role and expectations after the police 
officer is hired. Similarly, new recruits will need to be made clear of their role, 
and that they must uphold the law in all situations. Finally, other mechanisms 
that are typically in place, such as psychological and other forms of testing, 
will remain an important part of the selection process. This will help ensure 
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that the department hires individuals with the integrity and demeanor to 
effectively serve their community. 
Another concern is that the community representatives chosen or most 
likely to participate are not necessarily members of groups most likely to be 
victimized by crime or targeted by police as suspects. If all constituencies are 
not represented, then the benefits could fall to one group, further marginalizing 
an already vulnerable or politically disenfranchised group.158 Such a result 
would be antithetical to the goals of community policing, and those 
implementing these programs would need to be careful to avoid this scenario. 
Policymakers have had some success with best practices in selecting among 
various stakeholders in the context of negotiated rulemaking, and perhaps 
those principles could be applied in this context.159 
Finally, scholars should make efforts to empirically test many of the 
assumptions underlying programs that involve community stakeholders in the 
selection and recruitment of officers. After a program allowing for community 
involvement in the selection and hiring of police officers has been 
implemented, it would be important to know whether community perception 
about the police and the police department has changed. It might be important 
to determine whether complaints against the police decreased after the 
implementation of the program. Finally, another important question would be 
whether or not citizen-police partnerships had been positively impacted. This 
might be measured in terms of new initiatives created or the number of citizens 
involved in these partnerships. 
Allowing community members a role in determining who is hired and what 
qualities these officers will possess is consistent with allowing the community 
to set goals and priorities for their specific communities. A hiring process that 
involves stakeholders and how police officers are chosen could have important 
implications for the organizational culture of police departments. 
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